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Using Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
Fight Voter Suppression Tactics After Shelby
County v. Holder Without a New Section 4(b)

Formula
by JESSICA CASSELLA*
Voting in the United States is the fundamental act of self-government. It
provides the citizen in our free society the right to make a judgment, to state a
choice, to participate in the running of his government-in the community, the
ballot box is the medium for the expression of the
State, and the Nation. The
1
governed.
the
of
consent
Our fathers believed that if this noble view of the rights of man was to flourish, it
must be rooted in democracy. The most basic right of all was the right to choose
your own leaders. The history of this country, in large measure, is the history of
the expansion of that right to all of our people.
Many of the issues of civil rights are very complex and most difficult. But about
this there can and should be no argument. Every American citizen must have an
equal right to vote. There is no reason which can excuse the denial of that right.
There is no duty which weighs more heavily on us than the duty we have to
2
ensure that right.

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings, College of the Law; B.S.
2011, Santa Clara University, Political Science. I am grateful to Professor Joel Paul, who
provided valuable guidance throughout the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank
my friends and family for their continued support, and the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly membership for their hard work and dedication.
REP. ON
& VOTING PARTICIPATION,
1. COMM'N ON REGISTRATION
REGISTRATION & VOTING PARTICIPATION 5 (1963), available at http://babel.hathitrust.

org/cgi/pt?id=mdp. 39015041176648;view=lup;seq=12.
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, President Johnson's Special Message to the Congress: The
American Promise (March 15, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-bainesjohnson/speeches-films/president-johnsons-special-message-to-the-congress-the-americanpromise/.
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Introduction
In Shelby County v. Holder,3 the United States Supreme Court
struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). 4
Section 4(b) provided a formula that subjected certain "covered"
jurisdictions to preclearance requirements defined in Section 5!
Because Section 4(b) and Section 5 were intertwined, the Court's
express invalidation of Section 4(b) effectively nullified Section 5-at
least until Congress drafts another Section 4(b) formula responding
to current political conditions.6
In Shelby County, the Court ruled that the coverage formula in
Section 4(b) was unconstitutional.
The Court provided three
principle rationales. First, the Court stated that "the [VRA] imposes
current burdens and must be justified by current needs."' Second, the
Court noted that "[t]he Federal Government does not ... have a
general right to review and veto state enactments before they go into
effect."'
The Court supported this position by citing the Tenth
Amendment, which protects state sovereignty and provides that the
power not delegated to the federal government is reserved to the
states. 9 The Court discussed the value of federalism not just as an
end, but as a means to an end to ensure rights that are enabled only
by the "diffusion of sovereign power."10 Third, the Court stated that
"a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." 1' The Court held
that Section 4(b) of the VRA violated these principles by suspending
all state election laws until approved by the federal government, and
only doing so for certain states. 2

3. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
4. Id.
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012), invalidated by
Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612.
6. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631.
7. Id. at 2615-16 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2623.
9. Id. at 2623-24; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
10. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2623 (quoting Bond v. United States, 180 L. Ed. 2d
269, 274 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2622 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
12. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2624.

Fall 20141

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Section 4(b) and Section 5 contained several important
provisions invalidated by Shelby County. Under Section 4(b), the
covered jurisdictions included states and political subdivisions that
had a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1,
1964, and had less than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964
Presidential election.13 This formula included jurisdictions that had a
history of voter suppression and racial discrimination. 4 Section 5
required the states covered under the Section 4(b) formula to obtain
approval from federal authorities before changing "any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure with respect to voting."15 This measure provided a
proactive tool for the federal government to limit voter suppression,
instead of relying solely on case-by-case litigation in response to state
enactments.16
In the aftermath of Shelby County, it is important to consider
alternative methods to effectively enforce the VRA besides Section

4(b) and Section 5. This Note argues that, with some modification of
interpretation, Section 2 can replace Section 4(b) and Section 5 in
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
14. Voter suppression can be divided into two categories: (i) voter denial and (ii)
vote dilution. Voter denial has been described as the "first generation" of voting rights
cases, where certain people were intentionally denied the right to vote, usually based on
literacy tests and poll taxes. In contrast, e dilution has been described as the "second
generation" of voting rights cases, where jurisdictions have used gerrymandering and atlarge elections to decrease the voting power of certain communities-mostly communities
of color. There are a variety of recognized voter suppression tactics that today consist
mostly of vote dilution, including: changing polling locations or hours shortly before
Election Day, eliminating or significantly reducing early voting, limiting the number of
polling places, changing district elections to at-large elections, drawing districts in a way
that creates majority-minority districts or divides minority communities among districts,
and implementing stringent voter identification requirements at polling sites. These
tactics have been used for decades, and the prevention of these tactics is at the core of the
VRA. See Kathleen M. Stoughton, A New Approach to Voter Id Challenges: Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 292, 316 (2013); Lynn Eisenberg, Note,
States as Laboratoriesfor Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon DisenfranchisementLaw,
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 540 n.8 (2012); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 702
(2006).
15. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012), invalidated by Shelby
Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612.
16. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). See also Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) ("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is,
adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of
perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.").
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order to challenge voter suppression tactics. Part I of this Note
briefly describes the history and background of Section 2. Part II
discusses the various constitutional challenges to Section 2, which are
similar to the arguments used against Section 4(b) in Shelby County.
Part III then defends the constitutionality of Section 2 against these
challenges. Finally, Part IV proposes amendments and alternative
methods to using Section 2 in order to strengthen enforcement of the
VRA after Shelby County.
I. History and Background of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
Congress crafted the VRA to support the Fifteenth Amendment
by preventing voter suppression and providing "stringent new
remedies for voting discrimination."' 7
In 1965, there were several important provisions in the original
VRA. Section 2 of the VRA prohibited the "denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color" on a nationwide basis. 8 The language in Section 2
intentionally echoed the language of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which states, "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' 9 In City
of Mobile v. Bolden," the Court held that Section 2 simply highlighted
and restated the protections afforded by the Fifteenth Amendment.21
Consequently, a plaintiff had to prove that the voting procedure was
enacted or maintained to intentionallydiscriminate. 2
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to reduce this burden on
the plaintiff.23 The new standard has allowed plaintiffs to show
discriminatory effects, instead of discriminatory intent, through a

17.

Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

18.

Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2,42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012).

19.

U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

20.

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).

21. Id. at 60-61 (1980) ("It is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse legislative history of § 2
makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth

Amendment itself.").
22. Id. at 66.
23.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS

ACT, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec_4.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
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totality of the circumstances results-oriented test.24 Currently, Section
2 of the VRA states that:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title,
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.25
This results language has allowed plaintiffs to bring voting rights
challenges not only in cases of discriminatory intent, but also in cases
where there were discriminatory effects based on a totality of the
circumstances. A report published by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary,26 and later adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles,27 provides
objective factors for the totality of the circumstances results test.28
These factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group;

24. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about-sec2.php (last visited Sept. 15,
2014).
25.
26.
27.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added).
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27 (1982).
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986).

28. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29. These factors were derived from the analytical
framework of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The factors were refined by the
lower courts, in particular by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(1973) (en banc), and affirmed by E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976) (per curiam).
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if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members
of the minority group have been denied access to that
process;
the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction;
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group; and
whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.' 9

The presence or absence of any of these factors does not per se prove
or disprove a plaintiff's case; it merely contributes to an
understanding of the totality of the circumstances. ° In Gingles, the
Court held that the "essence of a Section 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."31 In
addition to these factors, the plaintiff must show certain conditions
for success, including: that they are part of a group that is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority within the
voting district; that the plaintiff group is politically cohesive; and that
the white majority voting bloc usually defeats the plaintiff group's
preferred candidate.32 Some courts have held that more than one
racial minority group could be considered politically cohesive as long
as the Gingles factors in the totality of circumstances test is applied.33

29. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29.
30. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45.
31. Id. at 47. See also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012). See also Benavidez v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.
Supp. 2d 451 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
33. See Campos v. Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988); Romero v. Pomona, 665
F. Supp 853 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (recognizing rule).
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The Gingles factors and these three conditions for success provide
standards for Section 2 violations that focus on the discriminatory
effects of enacted electoral devices.
II. Why is Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act at Risk?
In Shelby County, the Court stated that "[o]ur decision in no way
affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in
voting found in Section

'3
2 ."

However, previous statements by the

United States Supreme Court justices and others have questioned the
constitutionality of Section 2 after the 1982 amendments because the
totality of the circumstances test focuses on discriminatory effects.
Chief Justice Roberts has stated that a test focused on discriminatory
effects would likely raise constitutional issues since the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments only ban intentional discrimination.35 In
fact, when Chief Justice Roberts worked for the Reagan
Administration as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, he
wrote a memo arguing that "violations of Section 2 should not be
made too easy to prove" since doing so would "provide a basis for the
most intrusive interference imaginable by federal courts" into state
and local processes. 6 He also noted that it "would be difficult to37
conceive of a more drastic alteration of local government affairs.,
Other scholars have supported this view, stating, "congressional
legislation must be aimed at preventing intentional racial
discrimination, not just actions that may have an effect that
disproportionately affects racial minorities., 38 Moreover, Justice
Scalia supported this view in his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano,39
stating that the discriminatory effects test actually encourages racebased decision-making, violating the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee:

34. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631.
35. Memorandum from John Roberts to the U.S. Attorney General (Jan. 26, 1982),
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-bin
derl/folder030.pdf.
36. Second Day of Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2005, at 21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspeciall/13
text-roberts.html?pagewanted=21&_r=0.
37. Id.
38.

'DisparateImpact' Isn't Enough, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2014,

12:00 AM) http://www.nationalreview.com/article/373958/disparate-impact-isnt-enoughroger-clegg-hans-von-spakovsky.
39. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009).
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I... write separately to observe that [the Court's]
resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil
day on which the Court will have to confront the
question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection?"°
Although Justice Scalia's concurrence was regarding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, some election experts have forecasted that
"[t]here is no question that the conservatives
on the Supreme Court
41
are on the hunt for the effects test.
Also, in the wake of Shelby County, many states are looking to
push the boundaries of Section 2 in order to defend their state
election laws. For example, in a recent court brief, the State of Texas
argued that a discriminatory effects test in Section 2 "would require
every voting law to have a symmetrical impact," which Texas argues
is impossible.42 For these reasons, as well as the fact that the VRA is
now in the national spotlight and therefore subject to attacks in its
entirety,43 it is critical to preemptively defend the constitutionality of
Section 2.
IM. Defending the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
Many courts have held that "[1]egislation to enforce civil rights
including provisions protecting the right to vote, is constitutionally
valid."" Specifically, Congress has authority to enact legislation to
protect the right to vote through the Necessary and Proper Clause,"

40. Id. at 594.
41. Voter ID Cases Could Let John Roberts Destroy Voting Rights Act, MSNBC.COM
(Feb. 14, 2014, 11:46 AM) http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/could-voter-id-challenges-back
fire.
42. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 24, Veasey v. Perry, 2:13-CV-193, 2014 WL 1340077
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2014), available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/mxvxrjpns6pz32/ motion
%20to%20dismiss%20voter%20ID%20-%20new.pdf.
43. The Seven Top Legal Stories of 2014, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2013, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/12/the-seven-top-legal-stories-of
-2014.html.
44. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 105 (2004). See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128 (1965); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17 (1960).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 18.

Fall 20141

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Supremacy

the

Clause,46

and

the Fourteenth 7 and Fifteenth

Amendments. 8
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Section 2 is
constitutional because it is consistent with the letter and spirit of the
The Court has utilized Chief Justice
Fifteenth Amendment.
Marshall's test set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland49 to determine the
constitutionality of Congressional actions. The test states: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
and which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional."' 5' Because of evidence that
individual litigation was insufficient to protect voting rights, Congress
designed and implemented Section 2 of the VRA as a proactive
measure to guard against voter suppression by the states.' In doing
so, Congress chose to focus Section 2 on discriminatory effects, rather
than just discriminatory intent, in order to reduce the burden on the
plaintiff. Under Chief Justice Marshall's "necessary and proper" test
provided in McCulloch, Congress' actions are "consistent with the
letter and spirit" of the Fifteenth Amendment. Therefore, Congress
is not limited to generally enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment-its
constitutional mandate authorizes it to act proactively through
Section 2 of the VRA.
Likewise, under the Supremacy Clause, Section 2 is
constitutional because Congress can expressly or impliedly preempt
state law in order to protect the Fifteenth Amendment. The
Supremacy Clause provides that "[tjhis Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
50. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. See also, id. at 327 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. at 345-46 and citing James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545,558-59 (1924)).
51. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328. See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46
("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.").
46.
47.
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to the Contrary notwithstanding. 5 2
The Supremacy Clause
authorizes Congress to preempt state constitutions because "[i]f the
legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of
the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under
those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery."53
The Court has previously held that Congress can expressly or
impliedly preempt state law in voting rights cases.' In Arizona v.
Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, the Court held that the state of

Arizona's requirement that potential voters provide proof of United
States citizenship is preempted by the National Voter Registration
Act's mandate that states "accept and use" the federal voter
registration form.5 The Supremacy Clause allows Congress to
interfere with traditional state functions, such as election procedures,
when state actions expressly or impliedly conflict with the
Constitution and/or federal law. Thus, state actions like those taken
by Arizona are impliedly preempted because they interfere with the
purposes of federal laws like the National Voter Registration Act and
VRA, as well as the Constitution, which is described below.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 is constitutional
because it ensures equal protection of voters' rights, protects
fundamental fairness, and provides procedures when voters are
disenfranchised. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits intentional
racial discrimination and protects the right to vote under the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause." As the Court stated
in Reynolds v. Sims,57 "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government. 58 Under the Equal Protection Clause, the:
fundamental principle of representative government in
this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex,
economic status, or place of residence within a State.
Our problem, then, is to ascertain, in the instant [sic]
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809).
See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2247, 2249 (2013).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 555.
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cases, whether there are any constitutionally
cognizable principles which would justify departures
from the basic standard of equality among voters in
the apportionment of seats in state legislatures.59
The Equal Protection Clause allows plaintiffs to challenge voting
practices that treat residents unequally in violation of the
Constitution. 60 For example, in League of Women Voters of Ohio v.
Brunnerj the League of Women Voters of Ohio alleged that the
State of Ohio's voting system violated the Equal Protection Cause.
According to the League of Women Voters of Ohio:
Voters were forced to wait from two to twelve hours
to vote because of inadequate allocation of voting
machines.
Voting machines were not allocated
proportionately to the voting population, causing more
severe wait times in some counties than in others. At
least one polling place, voting was not completed until
4:00 a.m. on the day following election day. Long wait
times caused some voters to leave their polling places
without voting in order to attend school, work, or to
family responsibilities or because a physical disability
prevented them from standing in line. Poll workers
received inadequate training, causing them to provide
incorrect instructions and leading to the discounting of
votes. In some counties, poll workers misdirected
voters to the wrong polling place, forcing them to
attempt to vote multiple times and delaying them by
up to six hours.
Provisional balloting was not utilized properly, causing
22% of provisional ballots cast to be discounted, with
the percentage of ballots discounted reaching 39.5 % in
one county. Disabled voters who required assistance
were turned away. White alleges that the touchscreen
voting machine "jumped" from her preferred

59. Id. at 560-61.
60. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477-78 (6th
Cir. 2008).
61. Id.
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candidate to another candidate, possibly causing her
vote to be counted for the wrong candidate.62
The Court held that "Ohio's voting system deprives its citizens of
the right to vote or severely burdens the exercise of that right
depending on where they live in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."6 3 Brunner exemplifies the view that vote dilution, through
voter suppression tactics like malapportioned districts, burdensome
voter eligibility requirements, and inequality within or among districts
in ballot counting practices, can be just as, if not more, harmful as
physically denying voters access to the ballot.6'
Some cases have also been brought under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under a due process rubric,
violations can be found under both procedural due process and/or
substantive due process. 65 One court has held that "[substantive] due
process is implicated where the entire election process[,] including as
part thereof the state's administrative and judicial corrective
process[,] fails on its face to afford fundamental fairness., 66 In
Brunner,the Sixth Circuit found that the League of Women Voters of
Ohio could also state a claim for substantive due process because the
allegations of voter suppression, if true, would fail on their face to
afford fundamental fairness.67 In other words, long voting lines,
unequal appropriation of voting machines to the voting population,
inadequate poll worker training, and inadequate procedures for
disabled voters are not fundamentally fair. Brunner demonstrates the
ability of plaintiffs to challenge widespread voter suppression tactics
as a violation of substantive due process, especially when a large
voting bloc is effectively disenfranchised.
Under procedural due process, "parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy
that right they must first be notified."' ' In Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont

62. Id.
63. Id. at 478.
64. The United States Constitution,THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/projects/votingrights/page?id=0004.
65. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978) (substantive due process);
Brunner, 548 F.3d at 478 (substantive due process); Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont Absentee
Election Bd., 762 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1990) (procedural due process).
66. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1078.
67. Brunner, 548 F.3d at 478.
68. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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Absentee Election Board, 9 voters challenged the constitutionality of
Arizona's procedure for counting absentee ballots as a violation of
procedural due process. 70 The court held:
While it is true that absentee voting is a privilege and a
convenience to voters, this does not grant the state the
latitude to deprive citizens of due process with respect
to the exercise of this privilege. While the state is able
to regulate absentee voting, it cannot disqualify
ballots, and thus disenfranchise voters, without
affording the individual appropriate due process
protection.7'
This holding suggests that voting rights can be protected under
procedural due process, even when the method of voting is merely a
privilege. Moreover, this holding recognizes the larger implications
behind voting methods and the application of procedural due process
in order to prevent voter disenfranchisement.
Finally, Section 2 is constitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment because it is a rational means to prevent voter
suppression and Congress is afforded significant deference under the
implementing clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fifteenth
Amendment states that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 7any
state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 1
Procedurally, the Court has determined the constitutionality of
the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment by using the rational basis
test. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,74 the Court applied this
rational basis test to the VRA, stating "Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting., 75 Thus, as long as Congress' actions are
legitimately related to the Fifteenth Amendment, those actions are

69. Raetzel, 762 F. Supp. 1354.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1358.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
73. See Br. for Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of
Resp't at 7, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) ("[I]n evaluating
prior extensions of Section 5 ... this Court has applied rational basis review.").
74. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
75. Id. at 324.
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constitutional. Although the Court has recently questioned this
standard, especially in the context of Section 4(b) and Section 5,6 the
Court has thus far declined to apply any other test than rational basis
when determining the constitutionality of Section 2." Also, the
"Court has consistently held that Congress should be given deference
when it legislates under the Fifteenth Amendment.""8
Because
Congress has presented significant evidence at every point of the
VRA reauthorization, "there is nothing that justifies a departure from
applying the rational basis standard to reviewing legislation Congress
passed to combat voter discrimination. 7 9
Substantively, courts have consistently affirmed Section 2 of the
VRA as a valid exercise of Congress' constitutional powers under the
Fifteenth Amendment. Congress has broad power to legislate voting
rights because of the implementing clause of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 8° This implementing clause states, "Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."'" The
Court has held that "[t]his power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than those prescribed in the
constitution. '" In Katzenbach, the Court held that "[p]rovisions of
[Section 2] were appropriate means for carrying out Congress'
76. See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 ("[The VRA's] departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets"); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (arguing for congruence and proportionality "between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"). However, Boerne, did
not affect the ability of Congress to redress state policies that have a discriminatory effect
without proof of discriminatory intent. 521 U.S. 507.
77. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003) ("[P]etitioners ask us to apply
the 'congruence and proportionality' standard described in cases evaluating exercises of
Congress'[s] power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we have never applied
that standard outside the § 5 context." (citation omitted)).
78. Sudeep Paul, The Voting Rights Act's Fight to Stay Rational: Shelby County v.
Holder, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 271, 293 (2013). See also
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 ("Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.").
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
81. Id. The Nineteenth Amendment, which protects the right to vote regardless of
sex, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which protects the right to vote for persons
eighteen years of age or older, also have identical enforcement clauses. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 2. Although each amendment has
different subject-matter focuses, the enforcement clauses of these three Amendments
have been treated under one analysis. 1 Federal Civil Rights Acts (3d ed.) § 1:10.
82. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327.
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constitutional responsibilities under [the Fifteenth Amendment] and
were consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution."83 In
Rome v. United States,' the Court held that Congress' enforcement
power under the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to
prohibit actions that do not expressly violate the Fifteenth
Amendment, but are otherwise not reasonable methods to promote
the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.8 5 Also, in Katzenbach, the
Court held that both the federal government and the courts could
enjoin operation of state voting regulations.8 6 These holdings have
allowed Congress to prohibit state actions that have discriminatory
effects, not only discriminatory intent, because they give Congress
discretion to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. However, the Court
has limited Congress' power in this area by preventing Congress from
creating an entirely new class of forbidden discrimination8 7 and
requiring Congress to show proof that current actions are justified by
current needs.'
Furthermore, the constitutional right to vote includes the right to
an effective vote. For example, in United States v. Saylor,89 the Court
held that Congress had power to punish state election officers for
committing conspiracy during an election in which a member of
Congress was to be elected ° Although Saylor concerned state
election officials physically tampering with a ballot box, this
precedent stands for the proposition that Congress has legitimate
authority to intervene in state election procedures in order to protect
a meaningful and effective right to vote. Other cases have also
supported this right to an effective vote in ways beyond physical
access to the ballot box.91 In other words, the "right to an effective
83. Id. at 308.
84. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
85. Id. at 177.
86. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
87. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (holding that the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, which attempted to lower the minimum voting age for federal
elections to eighteen years old, was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment).
88. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
89. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
90. Id. at 387.
91. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (the right to cast an
effective vote "is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional
structure"); P.R. Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 1973)
("the right to vote encompasses the right to an effective vote") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the right to an effective vote
[is] broadly [construed] as a right of meaningful access to the political process rather than
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vote, regardless of race, nationality, or creed, is as open to protection
by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box, and a state is subject
to federal legislation aimed at protecting the right to vote against
state restrictions deemed improper." 92 This idea of a right to an
effective vote is important because it creates a right not based on the
right itself-i.e., the ability to physically cast a ballot-but based on
the effect of that vote-having that ballot be counted. This allows
Congress to use the results-oriented test that includes the Gingles
factors and conditions for success (articulated in Part I).
These constitutional provisions and court precedent strongly
support the constitutionality of Section 2. Still, it is essential to
defend Section 2 against the rationales that the Court adopted in
Shelby County to invalidate Section 4(b) (discussed in Part I). One
rationale was that "a departure from the fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate
geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets." 93 As described above, this "sufficiently related" test has
never been used to determine the constitutionality of Section 2. Also,
with Section 2, there is less of an equal sovereignty issue because
federal government action depends only on states that implement
discriminatory voting practices. This is in contrast to Section 5's
preclearance, which always subjects the same jurisdictions to federal
government approval.94

. A second rationale that the Court relied upon to strike down
Section 4(b) was that, under the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he Federal
Government does not.., have a general right to review and veto
state enactments before they go into effect." 95 Section 2 does not
allow for this right of review before state laws are implemented.
Instead, federalism concerns allow the federal government to step in
to protect the letter and spirit of the Constitution, including the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Finally, a third
rationale was that Section 4(b) of the VRA did not impose current

narrowly as a mere right of registration and access to the ballot box"); United States v.
Post, 297 F. Supp. 46, 51 (W.D. La.1969) (under the VRA, the defendants had a duty "to
refrain from applying any voting procedure which will have the effect of denying to Negro
voters the right to cast effective votes for the candidate of their choice").
92. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 105.
93. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
95. Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2623.
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burdens that were met by current needs.96 This seemed to be the
main concern for the Court because Congress was relying on
demographics from 1964 when it reauthorized the VRA in 2006.w
Because of the centrality of these rationales to the Shelby County
court's holding, the next section of this Note will specifically address
how to strengthen Section 2 in order to address these concerns in the
future.

IV. Amendments to Strengthen Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
The Court in Shelby County said, "Congress may draft another
[Section 4(b)] formula based on current conditions." 98 However, as
one scholar pointed out, "a divided Congress is unlikely to pass
legislation touching on sensitive issues of race and political power." 99
In the meantime, and in case a new coverage formula does not find
political support in Congress, Section 2 will be used as the primary
vehicle to enforce the VRA.1°°
A. Modify the Gingles Factors
This Note proposes several solutions to address the loss of
Section 4(b) and, effectively Section 5, by bolstering Section 2. First,
this Note proposes amending Section 2 in ways that would encompass
the spirit of Section 4(b) and Section 5. One way to amend Section 2
is to modify the Gingles factors to reflect current social conditions
and recent voter suppression tactics. One additional Gingles factor
could be to consider the timing of the proposed change; are the
proposed changes going to take effect immediately preceding an
election, shortly before the voter registration deadline, or after a
majority of registered voters are from marginalized communities?
Many cases of voter suppression occur immediately before a key
election or voter registration date. For example, in 2001, after the
African-American residents in Kilmichael, Mississippi became a

96. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b).
98. Shelby Cnty.,133 S. Ct. at 2631.
99. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch.,
Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 451, abstract), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2336749.
100.

Justice Department to File New Lawsuit Against State of Texas Over Voter I.D.

Law, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/
August/13-ag-952.html.
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majority of the registered voters in the town, the local government
01
attempted to cancel an upcoming election.Y
The United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") intervened under the VRA and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because evidence showed
that the cancellation was intended to weaken African Americans'
voting strength."
When the DOJ required the town to hold an
election, voters elected the town's first African-American mayor and
three African-American supervisors."3
Another additional Gingles factor could be to consider whether
the state has different voting systems for state and federal elections.
This factor would contribute to the totality of the circumstances by
demonstrating how states treat voters differently for the same basic
right to an effective vote. For example, Arizona and Kansas are
developing a two-tiered system of voting to distinguish between
voters who provided proof of citizenship status when they registered
to vote (which will allow them to vote in federal, state, and local
elections) and those who did not (which will only allow them to vote
in federal elections)."
Although these additional Gingles factors
would not per se prove or disprove a plaintiff's case, they would
ensure that the totality of the circumstances test remains relevant and
current to fight various iterations of voter suppression tactics.
B.

Modify the Compactness Condition for Success Under the Totality
of the Circumstances Test to Include and Weigh Cultural
Compactness More Than Geographical Compactness

Second, the conditions for success for the totality of the
circumstances test should be modified in two key ways. The first
condition for success is that the plaintiff is part of a group that is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
within the voting district." This means that the plaintiff has to show
that a "reasonably geographically compact group of minority voters

101. The Voting Rights Act: Protecting Voters for Nearly Five Decades, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, (Feb., 26 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/VRAShelby-Background.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 2 States Plan 2-Tier System for Balloting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/2-states-plan-2-tier-system-for-balloting.htmi.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). See also Benavidez, 690 F. Supp. 2d 451.
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could form a majority within a district."' '° The problem with this
condition is that it excludes districts "that are bizarrely shaped or
whose minority populations are overly heterogeneous or below 50
percent in size" because they are not geographically compact or large
enough to constitute a majority of voters. '°7 Gerrymandering is
relatively common when drawing district boundaries, and districts
like these shown below' 8 are unprotected by this condition for
success:

109

Congress should reduce the weight of this condition for success
because it provides legislators with more incentives to gerrymander
and draw districts in odd shapes in order to prevent Section 2
applicability. This condition for success provides little value in
measuring the success of the plaintiff's case and the presence of voter
suppression tactics.

106. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 U. MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 49, (2006), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105
/ortiz.pdf.
107. Stephanopoulos, supra note 99.
108.

Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Future of the Voting Rights Act, SLATE.COM

(Oct. 23, 2013, 4:37PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/
2013/10/section_2_of the votingrights act is moreeffectivethan-expected new_resear
ch.html.
109. Id.
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Another interesting question that this first condition raises is: can
compactness include cultural compactness?11 In other words, will the
Court only consider geographical compactness in evaluating the first
condition, or can the Court also look at the homogeneity of the
minority voters who have been aggregated together?"' Traditionally,
the Court has only considered geographical compactness."' However,
the decision in League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v.
Perry".. changes this."4 In LULAC, plaintiffs alleged that redistricting
changes "diluted the voting rights of Latinos who remain in the
district. Specifically, the redrawing of lines.., caused the Latino
share of the citizen voting-age population to drop from 57.5% to
46%.""' The Court in LULAC, based on the district court's findings,
was concerned that even though districts may have similar
demographic and racial makeups, the districts may still not be
culturally compact." 6 The Court stated:
[A] State may not "assum[e] from a group of voters'
race that they 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.' In the absence of this prohibited assumption,
there is no basis to believe a district that combines two
farflung segments of a racial group with disparate
interests provides the opportunity that § 2 requires or
that the first Gingles condition contemplates. The
purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to prevent
discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise
and to foster our transformation to a society that is no
longer fixated on race. We do a disservice to these
important goals by failing to account for the
differences between people of the same race.17

110. Ortiz, supra note 106.
111. Id.
112. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (North Carolina's redistricting legislation
based on race was so irregular, without regard to traditional districting principles and
without compelling justification, that it was sufficient to grant relief under the Equal
Protection Clause).
113. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 427.
116. Id. at 430.
117. Id. at 433-34 (internal citations omitted).
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Relying on this analysis, the Court held that "it is the enormous
geographical distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border
communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these
populations-not either factor alone-that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes. The mathematical possibility of a racial
bloc does not make a district compact. 118 LULAC has created the
possibility of including cultural compactness in the analysis of the first
condition for success. However, the Court is careful to point out that
neither geographical compactness nor cultural compactness should be
evaluated alone. "9 The beneficial implication of this is that, whenever
geographical compactness is evaluated, cultural compactness should
also be evaluated. Still, this also means that evaluations of cultural
compactness must also look at geographical compactness. This may
limit the reach of LULAC because there was an "enormous
geographical distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border
communities."' 20 This statement implies that communities who are
not culturally compact still have to show that they are not
geographically compact; cultural compactness is not enough. This
would disproportionately impact physically smaller states, where the
state's burden to demonstrate that it is not "geographically compact"
would be difficult to prove. It is easier to show geographical
compactness where states are physically smaller and have less land.
Evaluating cultural compactness in addition to geographical
compactness is a step in the right direction because it allows
"geographically noncompact groups of minority voters to establish
violations so long as they can show that they are culturally
homogeneous...... This expands Section 2 because it provides another
factor to show compactness and relaxes the geographical compactness
requirement. However, in implementing this standard, it should be
noted that if cultural compactness is read to be a second requirement
in addition to geographical compactness, this may restrict use of
Section 2 for communities who can show cultural, but not
geographical compactness.
The Court should use LULAC as precedent to loosen
geographical compactness requirements and add a cultural
compactness component to broaden the reach of Section 2. The
Court should also weigh the cultural compactness component more
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 435.
Id.
Id.
Ortiz, supra note 106.
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than the geographical compactness component since the "essence of a
Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives.' ' 22 This stated purpose does not include
geographical factors if they do not relate to the social and historical
conditions. Cultural compactness, on the other hand, directly speaks
to these social and historical conditions. Thus, compactness should be
redefined to include and weigh cultural compactness more than
geographical compactness.
C. Permit Distinct Ethnic and Language Groups to Aggregate Under
the Politically Cohesive Condition for Success
The second condition for success is that the plaintiff is part of a
group that is politically cohesive. Politically cohesive means that the
minority communities in the district in question tend to vote for the
same candidates.'
This is distinct from the cultural compactness
described above because politically cohesive focuses on the voting
patterns, not demographic information, of the communities in
question. Political cohesiveness has also received some attention
recently because "the circuits are split as to whether different
124
minority groups may be aggregated to establish a Section 2 claim.'
In Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation v. City of
25 the Second Circuit
Bridgeport,1
held that there was a possibility of a
Section 2 violation where African American and Hispanic voters had
been aggregated to establish the politically cohesive condition, but
the Second Circuit did not specifically state that such aggregation was
permissible.'2 6 The Court has not explicitly decided this issue, but it
has indicated that a plaintiff relying on this aggregation of minority

122. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. See also Johnson,512 U.S. 997.
123. Ortiz, supra note 106.
124. Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 574 (2d Cir. 2012). Compare Nixon v.
Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding such "coalition suits"
were not permissible), with Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990) (approving aggregate Section 2 claims) and
Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (approving aggregate
Section 2 claims).
125. Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d
Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1283.
126. Bridgeport,26 F.3d at 275-76.

Fall 2014]

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

groups would have to demonstrate that all of its members are
politically cohesive.
In Growe v. Emison, the plaintiffs alleged that Minnesota's
congressional and legislative districts were malapportioned in a way
that diluted the voting strength of minority voting groups. 28 The
plaintiffs claimed that various minority voters of distinct ethnic and
language groups could be politically cohesive under the conditions for
success. 29 The Court held that the record did not contain any
statistical or anecdotal evidence of minority political cohesion among
the distinct ethnic and language minority groups. 30 However, the
Court did not expressly state that political cohesion among voters of
distinct ethnic and language groups could not be found. It merely
suggests that significant evidence is needed to show this political
cohesion. 3 This strategy of allowing political cohesion among voters
of distinct ethnic and language groups should be allowed, and future
litigation should ensure that the record shows abundant evidence of
cohesion among the various ethnic and language groups. Although
this requires significant data gathering and analysis, allowing this
political cohesion among voters of distinct ethnic and language
groups creates an opportunity to challenge voter suppression where
none previously existed. This strategy supports the purpose of the
Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA by evaluating the
political impact of voter suppression tactics on minority communities,
even if there are distinct ethnic and language communities within the
larger political community. This strategy also aligns with changing
demographics as communities become more diverse.
D. Allow for Cumulative Voting Remedies to Section 2 Violations
Finally, cumulative voting should be used as a tool to ensure full
voter participation in a way that reflects the demographics of the
district and as a remedy for Section 2 violations of vote dilution.
Cumulative voting allows voters to "(1) receive as many votes to cast
as there are seats to fill; (2)... distribute these multiple votes among

127. Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 574 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012). See Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993). See also Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 890-91
(9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of Section 2 claim because plaintiffs failed to show
sufficient cohesion, without discussing whether aggregation was in fact permissible).
128. Growe, 507 U.S. at 27-28.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 38-41.
131. Id.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42:1

the candidates in any way they prefer; and (3)... thus cumulate or
"plump" all their votes on one candidate or give one vote each to
several candidates., 13 2 Cumulative voting creates a remedy that can
replace the creation of majority-minority districts in order to foster
voting participation of minority communities. 33 In United States v.
Village of Port Chester, the district court found that "[c]umulative

voting is lawful as a remedy under the Voting Rights Act and New
York Law.' 35 In Port Chester, the plaintiffs claimed that "the at-large
system used to elect the six members of the Port Chester Board of
Trustees denied the Hispanic population of the Village an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." '36 Because the court found that this

system violated Section 2 and "no case law.., rejects cumulative
voting as a lawful remedy under the Voting Rights Act,"'37 the court
accepted cumulative voting as a Section 2 remedy as long as the
Village of Port Chester engaged in voter education about the new
cumulative voting system.'38 Likewise, in United States v. Euclid City
School Board,'39 the district court said that no particular election

scheme was required for Section 2 violations, and a cumulative voting
system could serve as one of those remedies.'4° The court stated:
Whether a particular plan is legally acceptable [to
remedy a Section 2 violation] is a fact-specific inquiry.
Generally speaking, however, a legally acceptable plan
is one that corrects the existing Section 2 violation
without creating one anew. Such a plan must ensure
equal opportunity in voting and afford the minority
population a reasonable opportunity to elect its
preferred candidate through meaningful participation
in the political process. '

132. Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Propriety and Use of Cumulative Voting Under
Voting Rights Act, 57 A.L.R. FED. 2D 477 (2011).
133. Id.
134. United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
135. Id. at 448.
136. Id. at 416.
137. Id. at 448.
138. Id. at 451.
139. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 751-52 (internal citations omitted).
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This meaningful opportunity to participate in the political
process includes evaluating factors such as the district's voting age
population, existing political realities, historical and predicted voter
turnout rates, and effects of past discrimination leading to depressed
turnout.'42 Although the Court has not yet ruled on the feasibility of
cumulative voting as a Section 2 remedy, the use of cumulative voting
may be restricted to certain kinds of elections. While some courts
have embraced cumulative voting in the context of local government
or school board elections,'143 at least one court has rejected its
application for judicial elections.'" Nevertheless, cumulative voting
creates an opportunity to remedy Section 2 vote dilution and foster
political participation in marginalized communities, and it should be
used more often to strengthen Section 2.
Conclusion
Despite the Court's ruling in Shelby County and its impact on
Sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA, Section 2 remains an resilient tool to
fight voter suppression tactics. However, important changes are
needed in order for Section 2 to have the same, or relatively similar,
vitality that Section 4(b) and Section 5 once had. Recognizing that
any changes to the VRA are difficult, and inevitably political, this
Note proposes several ways to strengthen Section 2 that would be less
controversial and would likely withstand legal challenges.
First, this Note proposes that a Gingles factor should be added to
consider the timing of the proposed change in the totality of the
circumstances test for discriminatory effects. Second, this Note
proposes that the compactness condition under the totality of the
circumstances test for discriminatory effects should include and weigh
a cultural compactness evaluation more than geographical
compactness. Third, this Note proposes that distinct ethnic and
language groups should be permitted to aggregate under the
politically cohesive condition for success, even though this would

142. Id.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987); United States v.
Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984); Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm'n,
615 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
144. Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998) (cumulative voting
inappropriate remedy for Section 2 violations, especially when used during election of
state judges).
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require significant data gathering. Finally, this Note advocates for
cumulative voting remedies to Section 2 violations. These changes
would significantly increase the strength of Section 2 to fight voter
suppression in the absence of Section 4(b) and effectively Section 5
because these changes do not require Congressional action, unlike
creating a new Section 4(b) formula. Moreover, these changes would
create enhanced tools for marginalized voters to challenge Section 2
violations.

